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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, reliability evaluation of substation automation systems has 
received a significant attention from the research community. With the advent of the 
concept of smart grid, there is a growing trend to integrate more computation and 
communication technology into power systems. 
This thesis focuses on the reliability evaluation of modern substation automation 
systems. Such systems include both physical devices (current carrying) such as lines, 
circuit breakers, and transformers, as well as cyber devices (Ethernet switches, 
intelligent electronic devices, and cables) and belong to a broader class of cyber-physical 
systems. We assume that the substation utilizes IEC 61850 standard, which is a dominant 
standard for substation automation.  
Focusing on IEC 61850 standard, we discuss the failure modes and analyze their 
effects on the system. We utilize reliability block diagrams for analyzing the reliability of 
substation components (bay units) and then use the state space approach to study the 
effects at the substation level. Case study is based on an actual IEC 61850 substation 
automation system, with different network topologies consideration concluded. 
Our analysis provides a starting point for evaluating the reliability of the 
substation and the effects of substation failures to the rest of the power system. By using 
the state space methods, the steady state probability of each failure effects were 
calculated in different bay units. These probabilities can be further used in the modeling 
of the composite power system to analyze the loss of load probabilities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cyber physical systems have been rapidly gaining attention in the past few years. 
The modern power systems with more and more integration of computation and 
communication technology are becoming complex cyber physical systems. Traditional 
electric substation systems are facing a challenge on integrating the physical parts like 
the conventional Circuit Breakers (CB) with the new digital relays and Ethernet Switch 
(ES) networks. Utilities and manufacturers have been using different protocols and 
devices in the electric substation design and operation, which often create some 
unnecessary technical difficulties and extra cost on coordination [1]. 
In recent years, IEC 61850, as a newly approved international substation 
communication standards has made significant impacts on the above cited problems by 
providing detailed specification of layered substation communication architecture. 
Considering the protection system on this new protocol, IEC 61850-9-2 digital process 
bus accelerates the development of all-digital protection system. With the applications of 
Merging Unit (MU), Ethernet Switch (ES) network and GOOSE (Generic Object 
Oriented Substation Event, a higher-speed peer to peer communication methods), the 
IEC 61850 substation is expected to have higher reliability than the conventional 
substation which has been used for many decades. Furthermore, many features 
mentioned in the IEC 61850, such as Fiber Optics, redundancy settings and self-testing 
and monitoring system, are contributing to improve the reliability of the IEC 61850 
Substation Automation System (SAS) [2]. 
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With high emphasis on smart grid, there is a growing trend to integrate more 
computation and communication technology into power systems. Intelligent Electronic 
Devices (IEDs) and digital relays streamline the ﬂow of information within the 
substation. The emerging new digital substation is, in fact, a complex cyber-physical 
system in which diverse physical devices (such as transformers and circuit breakers) 
seamlessly operate with cyber devices (such as digital protection relays, routers, and 
switches). 
While these novel communication and computational capabilities are expected to 
improve the performance of the power systems, they might also be an unintended source 
of failures and also be vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The complex interaction and 
interdependency between these components pose a significant challenge in evaluating 
the reliability of such systems. 
 
1.1  Motivation for This Research 
In recent years, reliability evaluation of substation automation systems has 
received a significant attention from the research community. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, all the previous work has either focused on the reliability of physical 
components of the substation or the reliability of the protection schemes (separately). 
The goal of this work is to develop a holistic approach that integrates physical and cyber 
components in the reliability study of the substation and provide its interface with the 
rest of the power system. In particular, in this thesis we integrate both reliability block 
diagrams and state space methods to develop a comprehensive approach for evaluating 
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the reliability of digital substation systems.  
1.2  Related Work 
The related work for this thesis can be considered as four parts: 
A. Works related to the analysis of IEC 61850 SAS models and functions. 
B. Works related to the building RBD and fault analysis. 
C. Works related to the building state space and reliability analysis. 
D. Works related to exploring different topologies applied to IEC 61850 SAS 
The Reference [3] used Reliability Block Diagrams to evaluate the availability of 
different components of substation automation systems that utilize IEC 61850 protocol. 
The same technique was used in [4] and [5] to analyze different architectures of 
all-digital substations as well as the availability characteristics of different redundancy 
schemes. In [6], was analyzed the reliability of the entire system. 
1.3  Organization of the Dissertation 
This thesis is organized as follows. A brief background of Cyber-physical power 
system technologies with IEC 61850 and its benefits to power systems is presented in 
Section 1. The main research objectives and related works are also included in this 
section. 
In Section 2, we introduce and describe the architecture of the IEC 61850 based 
substation automation system. In Section 3, we present a specific substation layout as 
well as failure modes and their effects. 
In Section 4, we present the methodology for comprehensive reliability analysis 
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of the substation network. And in Section 5, we explore the different topologies applied 
in IEC 61850 substation automation systems. 
Finally in Section 6, we summarize the impact on the whole system and conclude. 
We also mention the future possible research in this part. References are added at the end.
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2. IEC 61850 BASED SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEMS 
 
2.1  Substation Automation Systems 
Typical electric substations are supposed to receive, transform the electricity 
either by stepping up or down the voltage and then send it forward. Substations designed 
in the past made use of protection and control schemes implemented with a 
single-function, electromechanical or static devices and hard-wired relay logic. With the 
advent of microprocessor based multi-function Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), we 
get the opportunity to move more functionality into fewer devices; as well as resulting in 
simpler designs with reduced wiring. Beginning in early 1990s, industry developed a 
communications architecture that would facilitate the design of systems for protection, 
control, monitoring and diagnostics in the substation, which was the Substation 
Automation Systems (SAS). 
2.2  IEC 61850 Based SAS 
The IEC 61850 protocols provide the utilities and manufacturing entities with a 
new standard and design for the modern electric substation. Modern communication 
network technology and the use of merging units accelerate the development of 
substation automation system and push the traditional substation to the cyber-physical 
systems stage. Since the approval of IEC 61850 by UCA (Utility Communication 
Architecture) International Users Group in 2004, many European and Chinese utilities 
have implemented IEC 61850 standards on the newly installed smart high voltage 
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substations, i.e. 110/10kV air insulated substation [7]. Figure 1 depicts the IEC 61850 
based substation architecture; the different components are described below. 
 
 
Figure 1 IEC 61850 Based Substation Architecture. 
 
Regarding to the substation protection, IEC 61850 protocols standardized the 
data exchange rules over the Process and Station bus in high-speed peer-to-peer 
communications. Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) message is 
introduced through the entire system to make sure the high priority of the signals from 
Circuit Breaker IEDs. Some critical devices and structures are described in the following 
parts. 
2.2.1 IEC 61850 Critical Devices 
1) Merging Unit (MU) 
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A merging unit combined with the instrument transformer (CT/PT) monitors the 
working status of lines and devices. Unlike the conventional analog signal, MU can 
digitize the original current and voltage signals and send them over the Ethernet network 
in the form of sampled values. 
Existing Merging Units have the following functionality:[8] 
 Signal Processing of all sensors – conventional or non-conventional 
 Synchronization of all measurements – 3 currents and 3 voltages 
 Analogue interface – high and low level signals 
 Digital interface – IEC 60044-8 or IEC 61850-9-2 
The Merging Units (MU) multicast sets of measured sampled values to multiple 
other IEDs in the substation over the substation local area network, which shows as the 
process bus level. Status and all the information for circuit breakers and circuit switches 
are available through the input/output unit. Merging unit and these input/output units are 
usually combined into single devices and recognized as Merging Unit. 
2) Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) are devices that perform electric protection 
or control functions in power systems, with advanced local control intelligence and have 
the ability to monitor processes. IEDs receive data from sensors and power equipment, 
and can issue control commands, such as tripping circuit breakers if they 
sense voltage, current, or frequency anomalies, or raise/lower voltage levels in order to 
maintain the desired level. Common types of IEDs include protective relaying devices, 
load tap changer controllers, circuit breaker controllers, capacitor bank switches, reclose 
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controllers, voltage regulators, etc. 
The IEDs applied to IEC 61850 have the following categories: 
 Protection IEDs (Prot IED): 
These include the bus, transmission line, and transformer relays which perform 
protection functions. For example: 
SEL-487B Bus Differential and Breaker Failure Relay 
SEL-487E Transformer Protection Relay 
SEL-421 transmission line Protection system 
 Control IEDs (Ctrl IED): 
These include transformer tap changers with monitoring and metering functions. 
For example: 
GE Multilin DTR Transformer Tap changer Controller 
 Breaker IEDs (Brkr IED): 
These are the circuit breaker monitors and controllers which operate and trip the 
breakers. Breaker IEDs belong to process bus level as well as merging units. GOOSE 
messages are sent from these IEDs to the entire system, mostly the upper level IEDs, 
informing the state change and status that occurs in the local power electric substation 
network. 
 
2.2.2 Communication Bus Level Structures 
There are two classes: 
 The Process Bus: 
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The process bus enables the sending and receiving of digitized signals and 
messages between the process level and bay level, which builds a communication bridge 
for the control IEDs and protection IEDs to trip the breakers. Typically, the process bus 
applications cover interface units (like MUs) for voltages and currents, smart controllers 
(like Brkr IEDs) for disconnect and reclose switches and circuit breakers, which capable 
of energizing the trip coil of a circuit breaker for fault isolation. These interface units are 
usually located closely with each other, to communicate with the IEDs in the control 
level to perform protection, control, monitoring and metering functionalities.  
 The Station Bus: 
The station bus enables the communication between the station level and bay 
level, which make the higher control center (HMI, SCADA) in the station level monitor 
and observe the working status in bay level and process level. Typically station bus 
provides SCADA control, monitoring, alarm functions as well as engineering access in 
the substation. It also supports the Human Machine Interface (HMI) for lines diagram 
display, station-wide controls and data exchanges and communications with the help of 
Ethernet networks.  
The architecture of station bus is oriented to specific requirements of the 
substation. Ring and star topologies are the most usual architectures used by IEC 61850 
based SAS. 
 
2.2.3 An IEC 61850 SAS Test Case Layout and Configuration 
One specific IEC 61850 based SAS has been designed to test the requirement 
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specifications for simulation of communication network based on OPNET. The SAS 
layout has been fully tested and verified in [9]. In this thesis we consider that the 
physical components follow the layout depicted in Fig. 2. This is a typical substation 
layout that is used in many reliability studies (see e.g., [9]) 
In the following we provide a description of the various subsystems of the SAS. 
These include the description of substation, transmission and transformer bay 
configurations. 
 
 
Figure 2 One Practical IEC 61850 Based SAS Layout 
A. Substation Description 
Table 1 shows the details of this substation layout with the number of lines, buses, 
transformers and other components used. 
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B. Transmission line bay configuration 
Table 2 shows the components constituting each transmission line bay 
configuration. With this configuration, the network topology of this bay can be built as 
shown in Figure 3. To communicate with each other, all the devices are connected to a 
central Ethernet switch. It is important to note that in order to improve the reliability, two 
protection IEDs are used to provide redundancy. Breaker IED2 shown in Fig 3 is also 
connected to the Ethernet switch within the next bay. 
For circuit breaker protection design, we consider to use one-and-a-half breaker 
arrangement in this specific IEC 61850 SAS. One-and-a-half breaker arrangement means 
a double busbar substation where, for two circuits, three circuit-breakers are connected 
in series between the two busbars, the circuits being connected on each side of the 
central circuit-breaker [10]. 
 
C. Transformer bay Configuration 
For each transformer bay, Table 3 and Figure 4 show the configurations and basic 
component topology respectively. Compared to the transmission line bay, a control IED 
is included in this topology, to control and monitor the transformer tap changing status. 
Similarly to the transmission line bay, two protection IEDs are used to be 
redundancy with each other’s. Figure 4 shows the transformer bay network topology. 
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Table 1 Substation Details Description 
Components Name Numbers in Use Locations 
Bus 4 Bus Bays 
Transformer Bay 2 Transformer Bays 
Transmission Line Bay 16 Transmission Line Bays 
Breaker IEDs 32 Within each bay 
Protection IEDs 20 Within each bay 
Control IEDs 2 Transformer Bays 
Merging Units (MU) 20 
Transmission Line and 
Transformer Bays 
Ethernet Switches (ES) 19 Within each bay 
 
Table 2 Per Transmission Line Bay Configuration 
Components Name Numbers in use 
Merging Units (MU) 1 
Breaker IEDs 3/2 
Circuit Breakers 3/2 
Protection IEDs 2 
Ethernet Switches (ES) 1 
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Figure 3 Transmission Line Bay Network Topology 
 
Table 3 Per Transformer Bay Configuration 
Components Name Numbers in use 
Merging Units (MU) 2 
Breaker IEDs 4 
Circuit Breakers 4 
Protection IEDs 2 
Control IEDs 1 
Ethernet Switches (ES) 1 
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Figure 4 Transformer Bay Network Topology 
 
D. Bus bay Configuration 
Bus bays share the components with the transmission line bays and transformer 
bays and no control IEDs are used within bus bays. In reliability analysis, bus bays could 
only be considered with their failure effects. 
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3. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AT THE BAY LEVEL 
 
At the bay level of IEC 61850 SAS, we have used the reliability block diagram 
approach [11]. Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is usually used to show and illustrate 
the network relationships in the reliability analysis of the complex systems. The structure 
of RBD can define the logical interaction of component failures required to support the 
system operation. Reliability block diagram approach works well when the intent is to 
find probability of a given condition. The RBDs of transmission line and transformer 
bays are described below. 
 
3.1  Transmission Line Bay RBD 
According to the transmission line network topology shown in Fig 3, it is 
possible to find the Reliability Block Diagram for each transmission line bay as shown 
in Figure 5. In this figure, since all the devices are critical to the system, basically they 
are connected in series. For Breaker IED2 and CB2, they will be discussed in details in 
next parts when considering a fault occurs in the system. 
  
 
Figure 5 Transmission Line Bay RBD 
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3.2  Transformer Bay RBD 
According to the transmission line network topology shown in Fig 4, it is 
possible to find the Reliability Block Diagram for each transmission line bay as shown 
in Figure 6. In this figure, since all the devices are critical to the system, basically they 
are connected in series. 
 
 
Figure 6 Transformer Bay RBD 
 
3.3  Reliability and Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) by Using RBD 
According to power systems reliability concept, for exponential distribution, 
reliability R(t) should be, 
( ) itiR t e
λ−=  (3.1) 
Mean value for exponential distribution is designated as Mean Time To Failure 
(MTTF), shown as, 
0
1
( )i i
i
MTTF R t dt
λ
∞
= =∫  
(3.2) 
Since the each bay of IEC 61850 based SAS can be considered as a complex of 
parallel and series structures, it is necessary to consider the theoretical analysis of basic 
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system only consisting of two basic components, series and parallel individually. 
Additionally, since all the devices can be recognized as repairable, the whole system will 
be considered as a repairable system. 
A. Series Systems: 
The series system structure and the Markov model for a repairable system are shown as 
in Figure 7(a) and Figure 7(b):  
‘U’ represents Up, which means the component is working properly 
‘D’ represents Down, which means the component is not working  
 
 
Figure 7 Repairable Series System(a) with Marcov Model(b) 
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Reliability of the series system shown as, 
1 2 1 2( )
1 2( ) ( ) ( )
t t t
sR t R t R t e e e
λ λ λ λ− − − += = =  (3.3) 
Failure rate and MTTF are then obtained as, 
0
1 2
1
( )s sMTTF R t dt λ λ
∞
= =
+∫  
(3.4) 
1 2seriesλ λ λ= +  (3.5) 
B. Parallel System: 
The parallel system structure and the Markov model for a repairable system are 
shown as in Figure 8(a) and Figure 8(b):  
‘U’ represents Up, which means the component is working properly 
‘D’ represents Down, which means the component is not working  
 
Reliability of the parallel system shown as, 
1 2 1 2( )
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t
pR t R t R t R t R t e e e
λ λ λ λ− − − += + − = + −  (3.6) 
Failure rate and MTTF are then obtained as, 
0
1 2 1 2
1 1 1
( )p pMTTF R t dt λ λ λ λ
∞
= = + −
+∫  
(3.7) 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
( )
parallel
λ λ µ µ
λ
λ µ µ λ µ µ
+
=
+ +
 
(3.8) 
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Figure 8 Repairable Parallel System(a) with Marcov Model(b) 
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4. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AT SUBSTATION LEVEL 
 
To understand how the failures at the bay level translate to the substation level, 
first we describe the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). Subsequently we will 
describe the reliability model at the substation level using the results of this FMEA. 
 
4.1  Signal Flow within IEC 61850 Based SAS  
IEC 61850 protocols provided powerful data exchanging channel and capacity. 
There are three kinds of major high priority signals: Sample Values, sent by merging 
units; Trip message sent by protection IEDs and GOOSE message sent by breaker IEDs. 
When detecting faults on the transmission lines or transformers, merging units 
will generate and send the digitized sample values to protection IEDs through Ethernet 
switches. After receiving these signals, protection IEDs send trip messages to breaker 
IEDs to control the circuit breakers to open the circuit. Breaker IEDs will generate the 
highest priority GOOSE message to protect the circuits and send signals back to higher 
control level through the Ethernet network. 
Any parts broken or any excessive delays on these messages will make the 
line/transformer protection fail to work and so the consequences are severe, not only on 
the fault lines but also on other lines or even one entire bus. 
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4.2  Failure Modes & Effects Analysis Based on Substation Protection 
4.2.1 Transmission Line Bay Failure Modes & Effects 
Since two transmission lines share three circuit breakers, the two transmission 
line bays would be considered and analyzed together to obtain their failure modes and 
effects. As Line 1 and Line 2 are symmetrical with each other, only one fault on either 
Line 1 or Line 2 would be considered for illustration. The other one has the similar 
results. In this part, ESi, MUi, IEDi stand for the devices in within the ith bay. Figure 9 
shows the two transmission line bays with a fault on Line 1. 
According to Figure 5, the Transmission Line Bay RBD (depicted in Fig 5), since 
ES, MU, ProtIEDs, and BrkrIED1 are connected in series mode,  
 
Figure 9 Two Transmission Line Bays with a Fault on Line 1 
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these components can be combined as a block for determining the failure effects. The 
following are the possible failure modes and their effects. 
 
A. All components operate as intended: 
When there is a fault on Line1, the MU will detect the fault on Line 1 and send 
the digitized messages to ProtIEDs through the ES. Then the ProtIEDs will send a 
GOOSE message over the network to trip BrkrIED1 and BrkrIED2 to open the CB. In 
this case, Line1 is correctly tripped by the fault and Line2, Bus1 and Bus 2 will not be 
affected. 
B. One or more components of ES1, MU1, ProtIED1, BrkrIED1 fail to operate: 
When the fault occurs, CB1 and CB2 will not open at first since the network in 
Bay1 fails to work. When this fault comes to affect the Line 2 across CB2, the network 
in Bay2 will be able to clear this fault by tripping the CB2 to open. In this case, Line 1 
and Bus 1 will be isolated as bus 1 is connected to Line 1 because of the failure of CB1 
to operate. 
C. BrkrIED2 fails to operate 
Fault will transfer to Line 2 across the failed CB2, but could be cleared by CB1 
and CB3. In this case, Line 1 and Line 2 will be isolated. 
Based on this analysis, Table 4 gives the summary of all the failure modes and 
effects, when considering all the possible component failure. 
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Table 4 Summary of Failure Effects in Two Transmission Line Bays 
 
 
4.2.2 Transformer Bay Failure Modes & Effects Analysis  
The most serious problems in transformers result from winding faults. 
Furthermore, only the busses in High-Voltage (HV) side will be illustrated to check the 
fault effect because they are symmetrical with each other. Figure 10 shows the 
High-Voltage side transformer bays with winding faults. 
According to the Transformer Bay RBD, components ES, MU, CtrlIED and 
ProtIEDs are in a series mode which means that for purpose of reliability analysis, all 
these components can be integrated into one block. In this case, only BrkrIED1, 
BrkrIED2 and the combinations of ES, MU, CtrlIED and ProtIED are left to check the 
failure modes and effects. Following are the failure modes and effects. 
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Figure 10 HV Side Transformer Bays with Winding Fault 
 
A. All component are normal 
When the winding fault occurs, MU on the HV side can detect the fault and send 
the message over the Ethernet network to the CrtlIED and ProtIEDs. Then these IEDs 
will generate the GOOSE message to trip the CB1 and CB2. In this case, the fault will be 
isolated correctly on the transformer side, and Bus1, Bus2 will not be affected. 
B. One or more of ES, MU, CtrlIED and ProtIEDs fail to operate 
When one or more of these components fail to work, the network within this bay 
cannot respond to deal with the winding fault. In other words, no CBs will be tripped to 
open and all the transformers and buses need be isolated. 
C. BrkrIED1 or BrkrIED2 fails to operate 
The Ethernet network will transfer the message to trip the CBs. However, since 
the BrkrIEDs fail to operate, either Bus1 or Bus2 will be affected under this condition. 
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Based on this analysis, Table 5 gives the summary of all the failure modes and 
effects, when considering all the possible component failure. 
 
Table 5 Summary of Failure Effects in HV Transformer Bay 
 
 
4.3  Integration at the Substation Level   
Now we will use the results of the FMEA to analyze the impact at the substation 
level. Since IEC 61850 based SAS combines the modern communication and traditional 
physical substation devices, it is hard to consider all the situations and device status. 
However, some reasonable assumptions can be made to simplify the analysis. First we 
will outline the assumptions made, and then we will describe the state space approach 
used to translate the effect of bay level failures to substation level.  
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4.3.1 Assumptions 
Comparing to the simple two-component systems, IEC 61850 SAS includes 
variety of complex devices, which build a more complex structures. In this case, we need 
to consider different conditions when dealing with the reliability analysis, instead of 
direct calculations. Even though, we still can use a similar methodology that we used 
above applying to the IEC 61850 SAS, with certain assumptions. 
IEC 61850 intends to use fiber optics instead of copper wires, which could 
increase the system reliability. Meanwhile, modern communication itself has variety of 
protocols and schemes to make the cyber system reliable. Because of this, the Ethernet 
communication media between devices are very reliable, and are not considered in the 
following analysis. We will combine the CB with the BrkrIED to act as one part for 
analysis, which means we can assume that BrkrIEDs acts as the CB and Breaker IED at 
the same time. 
For MU, usually a Timing Source is connected to synchronize the system. This is 
to make sure the communication over the whole system is in a normal state. This device 
typically is designed and maintained very well as the whole communication system will 
suffer as a result of its failure. We can assume the TS are very reliable along with the 
MU. For simplicity, the MU and Instrument Transformer are regarded as one unit. 
For modern substation protection system, the main functional parts of protection 
system are usually designed to be located in isolated places where the physical distances 
between them are far enough to avoid mutual interference [12]. In this case, it is 
reasonable for us to assume all the components of IEC 61850 SAS are independent of 
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each other in most cases. What’s more, the component state durations are assumed to be 
exponentially distributed. 
Within this section, transmission line bays and transformer bays will be analyzed 
respectively, and Ethernet network topologies are not considered. Table 6 shows a 
reliability data for different components, including the MTTF (Years), FR, MRT (Days) 
and RpR. 
 
Table 6 General Reliability Data of Each Component 
 
 
 
For every component, only UP and Down states are considered in this paper as 
shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11 State Diagram for Each Component 
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4.3.2 State Space Approach 
From tables 4 and 5, it can be seen that the cyber components can be considered 
in groups and the various groups have different effects on the physical system, ie, the 
buses and lines. To find the probabilities of the various effects, state space approach [13], 
can be conveniently used. First the equivalent failure and repair rates of composite 
groups can be determined and then the state space of the composite components can be 
created. 
4.4  Case Studies 
4.4.1 Modeling the Effect of Transmission Line Bay Failures 
Based on reliability block diagrams shown in Figures 3 and 7 and according to 
the failure mode and effects analyses summarized in Table 4, there are three major 
blocks to be considered in the state space model (see Figure 12). For ProtIED*, two 
ProtIEDs in parallel provide redundancy for each other. 
 
 
Figure 12 Three Major Components Blocks in Transmission Lines Bay 
 
For new composite components 1, 2 and 3, we can obtain the equivalent failure 
rates and repair rates by using network reduction methods. For composite components 1 
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and 2, we call the equivalent failure and repair rates by λ1 and μ1. 
1 Pr 0.04ES o MU Brkrλ λ λ λ λ= + + + =  
Pr Pr
1
Pr
( )
/ 52.11
1
ESu ou MUu Brkru ES o MU Brkr
f
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λ λ λ λ
µ
+ + +
= = =
−
 
For composite components 3, we denote the equivalent failure and repair rates by 
λ2 and µ2: 
2
2
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52.14
Brkr
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λ λ
µ µ
= =
= =
 
Figure 13 shows the State Transition Diagram for this system. 
 
 
Figure 13 State Transition Diagram for Transmission Line Bay Systems 
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By constructing the Transition Matrix R of the 8-states systems and using: 
1
2* 0T
n
P
P
R
P
 
 
  =
 
 
 

 
(4.1) 
1
1
n
i
i
P
=
=∑  (4.2) 
, different steady state probabilities can be calculated, shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 Steady State Probabilities of Failure Effects (Transmission Lines) 
 
 
4.4.2 Modeling the Effect of Transformer Bay Failures  
Similar to the Transmission Line Bay, multiple devices can be combined into 
composite components. Figure 14 shows the three major blocks to be analyzed. This 
figure is based on the structure of Figure 10 and Figure 14. 
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Figure 14 Three Major Components Blocks in Transformer Bay 
 
For new composite components 1, 2 and 3, we can obtain the equivalent failure 
rates and repair rates by using network reduction methods. For composite components 1, 
we call the equivalent failure and repair rates by λ1 and μ1. For composite components 2 
and 3, we call the equivalent failure and repair rates by λ2 and μ2. 
For composite system 1: 
1 0.03000383λ =  
1 52.143µ =  
For composite systems 2 and 3: 
2 0.01Brkrλ λ= =  
2 k 52.14Br rµ µ= =  
For State Space analysis, Figure 15 shows the State Transition Diagram for this 
system. 
By constructing the Transition Matrix R and using (4.1) and (4.2), steady state 
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probabilities of each failure effects are given in Table 8. 
 
 
Figure 15 State Transit Diagram for Transformer Bays Systems 
 
4.5 Summary 
For a set of two lines, protected by three breakers, Tables 7 and 8 give the 
probabilities of isolating the various components of the substation as a result of the cyber 
failures. There are 16 lines arranged in 8 pairs. Although only one pair has been analyzed, 
the analysis is the same for the remaining pairs. The probabilities calculated  
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Table 8 Steady State Probabilities of each Failure Effects (Transformer) 
 
 
in Table 8 are critical for modeling at the system level. These values indicate the 
probabilities of various components failing to operate as they should if the cyber part did 
not have any failure and was functioning correctly. This is like the hidden failures in 
protection system which can lead to wider outages than the intended ones as a result of 
faults. 
For example, it can be seen from Table 7, that if the fault is on L1 and there is no 
failure of cyber components, then L1 will be isolated and down. But for various cyber 
failures, more than L1 can be down. For some combinations of cyber failures, L1 and L2 
can both be down and for others; the buses can be also down leading to much more 
serious outages of transmission lines. 
So this analysis basically provides the probabilities of various cyber outages and 
their impact on outage of lines and buses in the substation. This information can then be 
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incorporated into the composite system reliability evaluation methods to study the effect 
on the whole bulk power system. 
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5. IEC 61850 SAS REDUNDANCY AND TOPOLOGY ANALYSIS  
 
5.1  Introduction  
In an actual power substation system, especially if high reliability of protections 
is required, redundancy is an important issue. Since IEC 61850 doesn’t give specific 
redundancy settings, most of current IEC 61850 SAS set the redundancy depending on 
customer requirements. Typical redundancy settings are parallel redundant 
communication system or ring redundancy system [14]. 
For network topologies, since IEC 61850is based on Ethernet Switches, there are 
several topologies for communication. Different network topologies provide different 
features for the specific substation. Currently, without setting the redundant ES, three 
major topologies are mostly used in current communication network: Bus, Star and 
Ring. 
5.2  IEC 61850 SAS Redundancy 
The fault analysis and reliability calculations in section 4 do not include the 
redundancy considerations. To avoid single point of failures, there need to be two 
process bus segments, which connect the sensors (i.e. MU) with the protection and 
breaker each. Each segment may contain an external or embedded switch [15]. If any 
component of one segment fails, the protection of only this segment is out, and the other 
one is still working to support the entire system. All the following calculations and data 
are based on Table 6. 
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5.2.1 Alternative Transmission Line Bay Design Reliability 
Considering the vulnerability of single set devices system, a design with 
duplicating the critical components within each transmission line bay and transformer 
bay is given in Figure 16. Protection 2, Switch 2 and the rest of red color parts are 
performing redundancy functions. For transformer bay, one Control IED is connected to 
Switch 2. More details are given below. 
 
 
Figure 16 Alternative Process Bus Design with Redundancy Concern 
 
Based on the redundancy concerns above, alternative transmission line bay 
design is given in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17 Alternative Transmission Line Bay Network Topology 
 
Compared to Figure 3, two sets of Ethernet Switches and IEDs are considered in 
each transmission line bay. As with the previous design, we still use one-and-a-half 
breaker arrangement. 
For new composite components 1, 2 and 3, we can obtain the equivalent failure 
rates and repair rates by using network reduction methods. For composite components 1 
and 2, we call the equivalent failure and repair rates by λ1 and μ1. For component 3, we 
call the equivalent failure and repair rates by λ2 and μ2. Major component blocks are 
referred to Figure 18.  
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Figure 18 Alternative Major Components Blocks in Transmission Lines Bay 
 
For the components 1, 2:  
Failure Rate: 1 0.00001534λ =  
Repair Rate: 1 38.35µ =  
For component 3: 
Failure Rate: 2 0.000003834λ =  
Repair Rate: 2 104.28µ =  
For State Space analysis, Figure 19 shows the State Transition Diagram for this 
system. 
Transition rate matrix can be given as follow in Table 9, according to: 
,ij ija i jλ= ≠  (5.1) 
ij ij
j
a λ= −∑  (5.2) 
By constructing the Transition Matrix R and using (1) and (2), steady state 
probabilities of each failure effects are given in Table 10 
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Figure 19 State Transition Diagram for Alternative Transmission Line Bay 
Table 9 Transition Rate Matrix for Alternative Transmission Line Bay
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Table 10 Steady State Probabilities of Each Failure Effects (Alternative Transmission 
Line) 
 
 
5.2.2 Alternative Transformer Bay Design Reliability 
Based on the redundancy concern above, alternative transmission line bay design 
is given in Figure 20. 
Two sets of Ethernet Switches and IEDs are installed in this system, but Control 
IED is only connected to ES2. In this case, RBD of this design is given in Figure 21, 
which showing the basic reliability relationships between all the cyber parts of the IEC 
61850 electric substation. 
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Figure 20 Alternative Transformer Bay Network Topology 
 
 
Figure 21 Alternative Transformer Bay RBD 
 
For new composite components 1, 2 and 3, we can obtain the equivalent failure 
rates and repair rates by using network reduction methods. For composite components 1, 
we call the equivalent failure and repair rates by λ1 and μ1. For composite components 2 
and 3, we call the equivalent failure and repair rates by λ2 and μ2. Major component 
blocks are referred to Figure 22. 
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Figure 22 Alternative Major Components Blocks in Transformer Bay 
 
Failure rate and repair rate are given as follows, 
For component 1: 
Failure Rate: 1 0.02002300λ =  
Repair Rate: 1 52.177µ =  
For components 2, 3: 
Failure Rate: 2 0.000003836λ =  
Repair Rate: 2 104.17µ =  
For State Space analysis, Figure 23 shows the State Transition Diagram for this 
system. 
Basically the methodology is similar with the original design. The things need to 
be modified are failure rates and repair rates, and the relationships of them. According to 
the State Transition Diagram, we could still conclude the Transition Rate Matrix for 
reliability calculations. 
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Figure 23 State Transition Diagram for Alternative Transformer Bay 
 
Transition rate matrix can be given as follow in Table 11, according to (11) and 
(12) 
Table 11 Transition Rate Matrix for Alternative Transformer Bay 
 
By constructing the Transition Matrix R and using (1) and (2), steady state 
probabilities of each failure effects are given in Table 12 
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Table 12 Steady State Probabilities of Each Failure Effects (Alt Transformer) 
 
 
5.3  IEC 61850 SAS Communication Topology 
Based on Ethernet network, there are several topologies for communication. 
Different network topologies provide different features for the specific substation. 
Currently, without providing the redundant ES, three major topologies are mostly used in 
current communication network: Bus, Star and Ring. 
5.3.1 Bus Topology 
The principle of Bus topology is to use the Bus Ethernet to connect the 
switchyard and the control center. Figure 24 shows a general bus topology used in the 
Station Bus of the IEC 61850 SAS [16]. 
Advantages are Easy-setup, low cost with higher reliability in the long run. 
Disadvantages are Low security, limited cable length and long delay. 
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Figure 24 Bus Topology Used in Station Bus of IEC 61850 SAS 
 
5.3.2 Star Topology 
As for Star topology shown by Figure 25, one critical Ethernet Switch is used to 
connect each bay unit. 
 
Figure 25 Star Topology Used in Station Bus of IEC 61850 SAS 
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Advantages: Simplicity of operation, lowest delay, good devices isolation 
Disadvantages: Lower reliability, too much dependency on the critical Ethernet 
Switch 
5.3.3 Ring Topology 
Similar to the Star topology and also based on Ethernet Switch, Ring topology 
connects all the devices in a ring and provides the dual-path messages sending and 
receiving, shown in Figure 26. 
 
 
Figure 26 Ring Topology Used in Station Bus of IEC 61850 SAS 
 
Advantages: No critical Ethernet Switch and low chance of collision. 
Disadvantages: Slow transit speed and higher network load. 
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In actual communication network, redundancy is an important factor to increase 
the system reliability. Based on redundancy considerations, many other topologies are 
used to build the substation network, such as Cascaded Topology, Star-Ring Topology 
and Redundant-ring Topology. 
5.4  Summary 
In this section, IEC 61850 SAS redundancy and several communication 
topologies are discussed. Since redundancy is very important in power substation 
protection system, alternative transmission line and transformer structure design are 
considered in this section. Basic design concept can be found in Figure 16. 
Reliability of the alternative transmission line bay and transformer bay are 
calculated, based on state space methodology as well. From Table 10 and Table 12, we 
can find when considering redundancy, whether the failure probabilities have been 
reduced compared to non-redundancy design in section 4. In this case, the reliability of 
the entire system has been improved. 
Different communication topologies with advantages and disadvantages have 
been introduced in this section. Certain topologies will be used depends on different 
environmental requirements or customers’ requests, such as reliability or communication 
delay.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
 
IEC 61850 Based Substation Automation System is still a relatively new 
technology in the power industry. The system combines diverse cyber and physical 
systems technology.  
In this thesis we provide a holistic approach for analyzing the reliability of the 
major components of the substation. In particular we analyze different failure modes of 
the various bays. The paper illustrates how the block diagram and state space approaches 
can be combined to model and analyze the reliability of this system. Using block 
diagram one can visualize the series and parallel effects and generate composite 
components. By using the state space methods, the steady state probability of each 
failure effects were calculated for different bay units. These probabilities can be further 
used in the modeling of the composite power system to analyze the loss of load 
probabilities. 
Alternative design with redundancy consideration and different communication 
topologies have been discussed after the non-redundancy reliability calculation. 
Reliability of the specific IEC 61850 SAS has been significant approved when adding 
redundancy components to the system.  For future work, the reliability of different 
communication topologies can be developed based on different network message 
mechanism. 
The work reported in this thesis can be used to evaluate the following:, 
• For a set of two lines, protected by three breakers, this project gives the probabilities 
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of isolating the various components of the substation as a result of the cyber failures 
• Possibilities of wider outages resulting from single line fault or single transformer 
fault have been explored. 
• These results can then be incorporated into the composite system reliability 
evaluation methods to show the effect on the whole bulk power system. 
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